The Populist Political Parties and their Overthrow in the Prevalent Order Maria NEGREPONI-DELIVANIS

Valahian Journal of Economic Studies Volume 9 (23)  Issue 2201833DOI 10.2478/vjes-2018-0016The Populist Political Parties and their Overthrowin the Prevalent OrderMaria NEGREPONI-DELIVANISUniversity of Macedonia, Greecedelimar@uom.edu.grAbstract

The world is entering a new international economic order, with clearly
different characteristics to the previous one. Apart from the fundamental rotation
(every 40-50 years) between the regimes of free trade and protectionism, the
decisive difference is the rapid rise of populist parties that are gradually displacing
traditional political parties and traditional governments in Europe and the world.
This development is the angry response of the victims of globalization, which has
created many losers and few winners. Despite some differences among these new
political parties, depending on whether they belong to the right or left, they all
share certain basic choices, such as closed borders, the return of nationalism, the
need for state intervention in the economy, a more equitable distribution of wealth,
the demonstration of hostility to elitism and the status quo, the limitation of
unregulated stock market economy, the greater emphasis on domestic production
and consumption than exports. This status change is important not only from the
point of view of mutating from liberal to illiberal democracy, but also from the
point of view of the radical economic changes expected at the international and
national levels. The main question, which at present cannot be answered, is
whether life on the planet Earth will be better or worse as a result of these
fundamental changes that penetrate our everyday life.
Keywords: nationalism, liberal democracy, populist parties, globalization,
protectionism, interventionism, totalitarian regime
JEL Classification: F, B
Introduction
Over the last few years, the West has been gradually entering into uncharted
waters. The familiar, the safe and the traditional retreats at a dizzying speed, and is been
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substituted by the unknown, the subversive and the threatening. Already, globalization,
which has been with us for almost fifty years, is forced to give up its sovereignty not only
to protectionism but also to an intensifying trade war. It could be argued that this shift,
between the freedom of trade and the enforcement of trade controls, is part of the
fundamental changes, which are to be expected approximately every 40 to 50
years (Lenglet 2014), so that it does not justify particular concern. However, this is not the
case with other kinds of upheavals that have recently invaded our lives, which can be
clearly distinguished from what used to be in the past. It is precisely these characteristics
that make the new international order unsearchable, while at the same time seeming to
abolish very strong traditional distinctions, such as that between the right and left
economic policies. These upheavals adopt choices of anti-globalization, such as the revival
of nationalism, which was particularly hateful during the period of globalization, and was
almost equated with fascist attitudes.
Nationalism is now rapidly gaining ground, and in conjunction with some
additional significant changes, it seems to be the harbinger of the endangered end of all
Western civilization. As our own culture has dominated the West for many decades, the
idea that it alone represents the ideal and unique world order has been consolidated.
Prevalent is the belief that the liberal democracy which after World War II is represented
and guarded by the United States, is eternal, unchangeable and irreplaceable.
Unfortunately, however, in recent years, the advanced centres of this western culture have
projected an irrefutable picture of general decline in all aspects of social, economic and
cultural life. According to all evidence, we are witnessing the end of the era of Western
civilization, as happened in the past with all the previous ones, following the same
prescribed route. That is, civilizations emerge, reign and die (Spengler, 1918). As nothing
in our world is everlasting, civilizations prevail over circles of 200-250 years, then giving
their place to others that emerge through their ashes. The end of Western civilization seems
to coincide with the end of growth or the entry of advanced economies into the stage of
perpetual stagnation, reviving Alvin Hansen's old theory (1939), thanks to its update by
Lawrence Summers and his team (2013).
In this article I will deal with only some of the transversal developments that
shook the Western world, focusing on the economic and regulatory field, which have as
their point of reference the emergence, empowerment and generalization of new political
parties, clearly distinct from the traditional. These are called "populist" by the panicking
traditional politicians. In Part I of this paper, I will try to outline the basic characteristics of
these newly established political parties as well as the main causes of their appearance,
while in Part II I will try to highlight the economic form and status of the new world,
which is expected to emerge from the prevalence of "populist parties".
1. Populist political parties
Populism dates back to 1980, and since then has grown steadily, reinforced by
globalization, the 2008 crisis, unprecedented large inequalities, rising corruption in
political life, mass immigration, and terrorism. Based on a recent Tony Blair Institute
survey (Mounk), populist votes in 2000 were, on average, 8.5% in each US state, and in
2017 they climbed to 24.1% respectively (The Economist 2018). What definition would
you give to populism? Jan-Werner Müller (Princeton University) attempts to answer as
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follows: It addresses "a morally pure and fully united people, betrayed by select, deeply
corrupt, and somewhat morally inferior people."
1.1. The causes of populism
1.1.1. The effects of globalization
A recent study (Mounk) attributes populism to low growth rates on a global scale.
Naturally, this can be seen as a general but not fully satisfactory explanation. Because,
although there was an anemic growth after 1985, if its distribution had followed regular
and not unacceptable forms of inequality, it would probably not have evolved into
populism.
Several years before the recent and rapid spread of populism, a series of
indications warns of the end of globalization and of entering a new international economic
order with features such as "protectionism", "nationalism", "controlled borders", "respect
for traditions", "interventionism", "anti-globalization" and so on.
Anti-globalization, which nourished populism, is the result of the wrath of the
losers and the marginalized because of the consequences of globalization. All of the
suffering that has affected most of humanity, with the predominant problem of
uncontrolled inequality of distribution, income and wealth that haunts the world, has been
attributed to globalization. Thus, when the public realized that globalization did not keep
its initial promise to "ensure the prosperity of all the inhabitants of Earth", but instead
proved to be the system that caused few winners and piles of losers, it turned directly
against it, as evidenced by the following selected points:
Based on estimates, around 65% of Europeans are in favour of restricting freedom
of trade, or in other words, in favour of de-globalization. However, the highest rates
dissatisfied with the effects of globalization are to be found in the United States, where
71% of citizens are worried about job losses due to trade with China, while 78% consider
America's financial dependence on China to be a very serious issue (Tuchman et al.). By
contrast, only 15% of America's big entrepreneurs declare that they are against
globalization, a result that obviously strengthens the conclusion of "few winners and
numerous losers". Moreover, a recent study by the European Commission (Timmermans
and Katainen), which expresses the anxiety about the reduction and the future of
globalization, also highlights a number of poll results, about how Europeans see
globalization, and through it, the EU which represents a smaller globalization within it.
With obvious perplexity, the European Commission acknowledges these results, according
to which 53% of Europeans are deeply concerned, and consider the EU as a threat to their
identity. Only 41% of Europeans trust the EU, although this percentage is higher than the
corresponding one showing their confidence in individual national governments (The
Economist ). 52% of the votes in Great Britain, in favour of Brexit, is certainly the biggest
proof of this shift in public opinion, against globalization, in Europe. This shift is
explained, to a significant extent, by the fact that "the working class in advanced
economies (which largely represented the Brexit voters) witnessed a very low income
increase during the entire long-term period of globalization (Scott)". The level of wages, in
advanced economies, which had their trade frontiers open to emerging economies, was
almost reduced to that prevailing in the latter. The effect of globalization on the USA (and,
of course, not only) was the increase in the trade deficit and the loss of five million jobs
over the past twenty years (Scott).
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1.1.2. The rise of nationalism
The general criticism against populist parties, which, however, does not
correspond to reality is their collective ranking to the far-right in political terms. Although
this criticism, is justified by a small proportion of these parties, it represents however, the
easy reaction of all those whose interests are affected by the decline of globalization. The
core of this criticism seems to relate to the fact that all these emerging parties raise to the
surface the concept of nationalism which had been forgotten, for years, receding under the
covert preparations for the advent of a global government (Negreponti-Delivanis 2014).
Nationalism is now attempted wrongly, in an arbitrary and unjustifiable way, to be equated
with far-right political choices. However, if nationalism is not extreme, in the sense that it
encourages hatred for other nations or different races, it is entirely acceptable. Because it is
unthinkable to comfortably brand someone belonging to the far-right, who loves his
country and is proud of it as a nationalist. The widespread tendency today to collectively
dismiss all nationalists as far right and fascists, is suspicious, dangerous and problematic
because it obviously conceals unspoken goals. Obviously and unfortunately there is the
problem of rising fascism with its abominable and dark activity, especially in Europe.
Against the serpent's eggs, urgent action is needed, but the solution does not lie in
condemning the new political parties, within which the fascist tendencies are, fortunately,
not the norm.
Already, an attempt is made to demote the content of nationalism as it evolves into
a central feature of the new international economic order, as confirmed by the following
statements:
 Lawrence Summers (Scott): "The political challenge in many countries is the
development of a responsible nationalism that rests on a policy that favours local interests
and indigenous more and above cosmopolitan aspirations."
 Michael Barone: "Trump and his nationalism with "First America" are not
necessarily bad. Also:" It is good to prefer one's country to another." "Nationalism can to
be a positive force". "Being proud of one’s homeland and all that is relevant to it is not
selfish and certainly not racist. It is patriotism and a natural reaction for a normal citizen."
 And social psychologist Jonathan Haidt Haidt (Scott): "Nationalists feel tied to
their homeland and are proud to be part of it. Globalizers want to wipe out the borders of
each country and get rid of democracy."
1.1.3. The search for greater security
Moreover, the rise of nationalism is due to the widespread desire, in advanced and
emerging economies, for more security and less risk, compared to the globalization regime.
Satisfying these trends requires a restriction on absolute freedom of trade and a return to
market regulation, which has been abolished in the globalization era. It also requires
removal from the obsessions of the "invisible hands" of classics, supposedly regulating the
market, and, at the same time, reconciliation with the need for state intervention in the
economy. The borders, which have been virtually abolished by globalization, are again
desirable, as they guarantee greater security. In these choices of the new international
economic order, the contribution of the migratory stream, accompanied by many and
unresolved aspects, was extremely important.
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1.2. The dominant features of populist parties:
1.2.1. Right and left-hand politics
Populist political parties belong to both the right and the left, and are distinguished
by numerous differences in their choices. However, their basic characteristics meet in
almost all the so-called "populist parties" and explain why their appearance in the world
has virtually deactivated the distinction between left and right politics.
At the moment, and although the relevant scene is constantly changing, as new
populist parties are added to the existing ones, the left wing includes the National Party of
Scotland, Podemos in Spain, Die Linke in Germany, and before being completely
subservient to the demands of lenders, Syriza in Greece. The right side of populism
comprises in turn the second largest political party in Finland, the third most important
political party in Sweden, the party of Viktor Orban, re-elected for the fourth time in
Hungary, the party of the National Front of Marine Le Pen in France and the Alternative
party in Germany, which is expected to be second in the upcoming next elections.
Moreover, the results of the elections of 4 March 2018 in Italy turn directly against the
"system" and should be expected to mark the beginning of the end of the EU and, of
course, the euro. The demoralizingly low 18.1% of Matteo Renzi's pro-European party is
overwhelmingly eloquent about the wrath of voters against the European course and its
choices.
The above-mentioned populist governments obviously belong to the United States
and China, both of which present additional features in comparison to the general ones, are
at the top of the global pyramid, and the United States is fighting to preserve world
sovereignty, and China for its acquisition. But, Russia, in spite of the quirks of its
governance also belongs to the general category of countries with populist government.
Furthermore, it is possible to add governments that were helped to come to power by
populist parties such as the case of Austria, Bulgaria, Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands,
Norway and Latvia.
Despite the differences between right-wing and left-wing populist parties as well
as hybrids, all of them coincide with several common choices, such as anti-globalization,
nationalism, state interventionism, an attempt to achieve prosperity for all, opposition to
elitism and the established order, opposition to long-term austerity policies, and opposition
to the extreme forms of the stock market economy.
The emerging populism of our days is directed generally against elitism,
traditional politics and dominant institutions, national and international, in a word against
the established order. Populism represents the ordinary citizen, who thinks that he was
forgotten and betrayed by his politicians. Populism proclaims that it expresses genuine
patriotism. Its proponents are angry at the behaviour of politicians and the general breach
of their promises. The vote for Donald Trump is interpreted as a voter's desire to leave
behind the bad political past of globalization.
Apart from the convergence of the two populist political movements on most
important goals, it is interesting to note that, in particular, the right-wing populist side has
broken its relations with traditional assumptions of its faction, such as the opposition
towards state intervention in the economy, as well as the belief in continued austerity. The
choice of Donald Trump, as well as of several other European politicians close to power, is
based precisely on their promises to abandon globalization, in favour of protectionism, as
well as the abandonment of dogmatic neo-liberalism.
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1.2.2. The differences in the preferences between right-wing and left-wing populist
parties
The pair of choices of the new international economic order, as proclaimed at
least, appears under a seemingly new label: open and closed borders. This is certainly not a
new distinction, but merely a verbal evolution of the ever-existing divide between the
status of freedom of international trade and that of protectionism, or even more recently,
between globalization and border nationalism. Although the continuation of the traditional
distinction between deregulation and regulation of international trade, even under different
titles, seems to face no problems, these do emerge however, since attempts are made to
classify their individual choices into the two traditional political parties, right and left.
Indeed, there is a prevalent view that the traditional right is attached to economic
liberalism and to all the individual terms that follow it, such as the liberalization of
international trade, the free movement of capital and labour, the non-intervention of the
state in the economy, minimizing the tax burden, as well as the abolition of the welfare
state. And there is the additional hostility to mass immigration. On the contrary, the main
features of the traditional left have so far been the acceptance of the role and importance of
state interventionism, extending to the regulation of international trade conditions, the
recognition of the advantages of cooperation and complementarity between the public and
private sectors, considered to be of equal importance , paying special attention to the
welfare state services, the establishment of labour rights, recognized as the weakest factor
of production, in relation to capital, as well as the imposition of progressive taxation,
which aims at a fairer distribution of income. Supplementary but less secure discrimination
between the left and the right concerns the area of economic policy choices. The right,
which is recognized as the most conservative, generally seeks to achieve balance
everywhere. Its relations with microeconomic policy, which regulates and encourages
private initiative, is more visible and narrower, while being less clear with macroeconomic
policy. This explains the attachment of the right to austerity policies, but also the
preference for monetary policy, with the exclusion of fiscal policy.
However, the above-mentioned indicative distinctions and economic policy
preferences have recently been overturned. Apart from the clear opposition to the
continuation of globalization, this new hybrid form of political parties, some of which are
close to power, is an unsafe and unstable amalgam of piecemeal traditional economic
policy preferences, both left and right. Hence the difficulty of classifying them as left or
right wing. This is why the argument, put forward by various sides, is reinforced that the
distinction between right and left no longer exists, at least in its traditional form.
Despite these obvious difficulties of ranking the populist parties to the right or to
the left, their decisive common element is their intense hostility to open borders. It is
precisely this hostility, which has proved to be a powerful weapon for attracting
supporters, from the newly established political parties in Europe, and not only. The
increasingly rising number of voters from these parties, characterized by their political
opponents as pro-conservative and anachronistic, is opposed to the continuation of the
liberalization of international trade or the reception of refugees / immigrants on their
territory, or as a rule against both of these policies belonging to the policy of open borders.
1.2.3. Concerns about the rise of "populist parties"
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The rise of populist political parties can be explained by the "diversity" of the
positions they express and support, compared to the positions of those who have been in
power for the past fifty years and which are generally rejected by an increasing proportion
of the world’s inhabitants.
That is why these new political parties also pose a clear risk to traditional
politicians, who view them with surprise, discomfort and panic, as they threaten their
multifaceted and strongly vested interests.
The criticism of traditional politicians against the populist parties, focuses mainly
on the fundamental issue of the current government, which is likely to be overthrown and
less on the individual economic policy measures. Indeed, a significant part of the European
population, and not only, already states with no hesitation that it does not perceive the
regime of "liberal democracy" as a unique or undisputedly optimum form of governance of
the contemporary world economies. It is a reality for Europe that the traditional right-wing
and left-wing political parties are rapidly shrinking significantly, gradually giving their
place to new political parties, which are anti-European and favour the re-establishment of
the nation-state. This has also happened in France and Germany, although the EU
expressed its relief because these so-called populist parties did not come into power.
However, any EU triumph over the recent election results of its members is totally
unfounded, as the power of non-traditional parties is steadily expanding. In France for
example and in spite of Emmanuel Macron’s victory in the last elections, traditional left
and right parties ranked third and fifth, respectively, while in Germany, and in spite of
Angela Merkel's dominance, the two traditional political parties shrinked from 67% in
2013 to no more than 53% in October 2017. These new European parties, which are
targeting the EU and the euro are obviously panicking Europe and causing her to look for
ways of survival which, for the time being cannot be considered as successful. These
European citizens, collectively and contemptuously called "populists," have separated their
choices from those recognized as orthodox within the EU and falling within the broad area
of "Liberal Democracy".
The European "populists" are seemingly convinced that the EU is deeply confused
when applying policies that are sure to destroy it, such as the admission to its territories of
mass immigration and the abandonment of national sovereignty and patriotism, history and
national traditions. The abandonment in other words, of the national identity of the
individual nation-states. The EU monitors with resentment and also growing concern the
rapid spread of populists on its territory, but has not yet been self-critical about how and
why its basic guidelines are being abandoned by an increasing number of its citizens. At
this point it is very important to note that the European "populists" are not alone in their
actual refusal of being wiped out and accepting a global governance at a later date, as
everything seems to point in that direction within the EU. This is obviously how we should
interpret this wave of reclaiming and rescuing the national identity which, with many
variations in its details, has invaded not only Europe but the world as a whole. This refers
to Donald Trump’s America, Putin's Russia, Xi Jinping’s China, and also Latin American
and African governments.
Ending Part I of this paper, the general conclusion that emerges from the above
analysis is the stormy change of regimes in Europe and the world that jeopardizes the
maintenance of Liberal Democracy but at the same time also comprises the innovations in
economic, political and social life which modern societies are in vital need of, in order to
be able to give new solutions to their numerous and thorny problems.
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2. The new face of advanced economies
The content of this Part II refers to the future economic and political conditions
that will be incorporated into future societies. Dealing with future predictions necessarily
involves a high risk of discrediting them. However, this content of Part II, I believe, for the
most part, has a high probability for realization, precisely because the twists and turns it
refers to have already begun and are progressing without being hampered in their course.
Although, for the moment, there is dense smoke around the form, which will
eventually be taken by individual national economies, as the elements comprising the
international scene are still in progress, one thing is certain: globalization is limiting its
scope and nothing will ever be the same again.
The expected changes will be summarized, first of all, in their economic
dimension, paragraph A, and secondly in their political status, paragraph B.
2.1. In the economic sphere
2.1.1. National economies
The end of globalization and the establishment of protectionism currently seem to
be accelerating due to the choices of the new US president. Donald Trump's clear
preference for closed borders, which he has announced, passed and partly implemented, is
a trigger for a parallel course in the rest of the world. In other words, it consists of
opposing and refusing to compromise with what has generally been the policy of
traditional governments. Developing new guidelines everywhere. In particular, the
opposition towards any form of restriction of national sovereignty, the re-establishment of
the nation-state with increased intervention in the economy, the viewing of international
organizations with suspicion, the diminishing of the importance of the stock market in
favour of the real economy, the reluctance to welcome immigrants / refugees, and naturally
the condemnation of all thoughts of creation of a global government, are the preferences of
the American planetary master. Already every national economy suffers the consequences
of its return to reality, its possibilities and its weaknesses. It is guarded by the application
of protective measures on its trade, but it also suffers from the consequences of a raging
commercial war, which however has not yet acquired its final form. Anti-globalization is
the product of the reaction of the weakest of the planet, especially those who have been
deprived of jobs because of the liberalization of international trade, or have suffered a
deterioration in their standard of living due to wage competition by immigrants / refugees.
That is why there is hope, thanks to the new international economic order, to reverse the
unfavourable effect of globalization, which consisted of few winners and numerous losers.
It is also hoped that the positive consequences of this overthrow will counteract the
negative effects of the commercial war.
2.2. Statutory change / governance
2.2.1. The Liberal Republic is retreating towards "illiberal" Democracy
Postwar America has emerged as the richest, most powerful and most successful
country in the world. Her marvelous achievements in all areas have been aligned with her
liberal democratic constitution, which has been gradually adopted by most of the globally
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advanced world. Countries without Democracy and under authoritarian regimes were
marginalized, with lower per capita income and slower economic growth. Liberal
Democracy has prevailed in the past decades as the political regime which would
ultimately have to be adopted by all countries in the world, as soon as they managed to
secure a satisfactory annual per capita income, estimated at around $ 14,000. Liberal
Democracy countries have thus become a "model to be imitated," and democracy has been
recognized as the ideal government, meant to eternally prevail on earth and gradually
absorb all non-democratic and authoritarian regimes.
In addition to the high standard of living characterizing post-war economies with
liberal Democracy, the latter also presented three enviable conditions (Mounk and Foa):
relative equity, fast - growing income for all citizens, and the fact that countries with nondemocratic
status were generally less prosperous. Until the recent election of Donald
Trump, western civilization did not recognize any other regime apart from that of liberal
democracy which it tried to impose on the whole planet, even resorting to war. Indeed, one
of the basic excuses put forward by Bush jr. for the unjustified wars against Iraq,
Afghanistan, etc., was the need to "democratize" them. The notion that liberal Democracy
with capitalism is the only system that produces wealth and power was reinforced by the
collapse of existing socialism, since there was no longer an opponent.
All these foundations and advantages for the perpetuation and imitation of
democracy by non-democratic countries however, have been eroded. And the most
important thing is that, it turns out beyond any doubt, that the regimes considered as
authoritarian achieve faster growth rates than democracies. Indeed, out of the 15
economies world economies now showing the fastest growth rates, 2/3 do not have liberal
democratic regimes (Mounk and Foa). In addition, out of the 250 best universities in the
world, 16 belong to non-liberal democratic countries (Mounk and Foa).
The change brought on by Donald Trump's new international financial order is
very important, although it has so far gone unnoticed. The new president, according to all
indications, seems to have forsaken the right or more correctly the obligation of the US to
impose democracy on the rest of the world, as the only regime that can be reconciled with
capitalism and which was imposed immediately after the end of the Second World War.
The abandonment of this fundamental goal of American liberal hegemony changes
America's self-imposed regime towards the outside world, from "liberal
democracy"(Mounk and Foa) to "illiberal hegemony-hegemony" or even "illiberal
democracy"(Zakaria and Muller), or even "Democracy without Rights". This change was
deemed necessary because America had a lot of failures in this area and, moreover, with
the rise of the so-called populist parties all over the world, even more failures are to be
expected in the future. Beyond these failures, given that China, Russia, Poland, Hungary,
Turkey, etc. do not have liberal democratic regimes, the US's insistence on continuing to
impose it (even if is recognized as the best regime) often in non-democratic ways in the
past, even including armed conflicts, would be irrelevant.
2.2.2. The new regime under populist political parties
The impossibility of imposing democracy on countries that do not want it has been
fully understood with the economic rise of China, which has embraced capitalism, but
combined with the imposition of an authoritarian regime that has become more prominent
with the lifelong reign of its president in power. The same development is witnessed in
Russia, and not only, since similar widespread trends concerning populist and hybrid
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political parties have been recently prevailing in Europe, as already mentioned in this
Paper. It turns out that capitalism can coexist not only with democracy but also with
different regimes. There is also proof that democracy, at least under western standards, is
gradually shrinking, since it is the system governing an increasingly smaller population of
the world, but also the system that has ceased to meet its original specifications, namely
those of the ancient Greeks. So, it becomes quite frightening to answer the question: "What
part of the world is still the home of liberal democracy?"
2.2.3. The decline of Liberal Democracy
Sadly, the liberal democratic regime of the West is in great decline. And the simple
invocation of democracy, when it coexists with completely incompatible consequences, is
not enough to satisfy relevant concerns. I have the increasingly strong feeling that
references to democracy are being used as a form of diversion for a series of daily crimes
performed in her name. And I ultimately believe that the guarantees given through the
simple reference to Democracy only serve as a form of reassurance and resignation from
trying to find solutions to difficult problems. Thus, they often end up in unacceptable
situations. Situations, which ultimately do not differ from those corresponding to
authoritarian regimes, which do not invoke democracy. Let me emphasize, on this point,
that even the citizens of countries with democratic regimes do not have enough confidence
in them. Relevant research in America, which is probably the country where the
advantages of democracy are mostly being proclaimed, as opposed to all the
unpleasantness prevailing in countries without democracy, reveals that 45% of the
respondents have doubts about the positive aspects of the democratic government and have
little or no confidence in it (Survey Monkey). Undoubtedly, democracy has taken a
resounding slap from globalization and the uncontrolled inequalities it has led to.
The question here is whether this coexistence of capitalism with an illiberal
democracy is viable and therefore sustainable on a long-term basis, or whether the
conflicts inherent in this combination will lead to its dissolution, reverting to capitalism
with liberal Democracy or socialism. Opinions differ on this very crucial point for the
future of the West and the world. Those whom I would describe as optimistic argue that
authoritarian regimes can only survive in poor economies, such as China, Russia or even
Turkey, while on the other hand, when per capita income increases and the middle class
dominates, citizens will demand political liberalism. Although according to this view
capitalism, in the long run, eliminates totalitarianism, it is not possible to determine in
advance the exact timing of such a development. However, it is certain that political
liberalism will ultimately prevail, due to contradictions and dysfunctions of totalitarian
capitalism, such as corruption, inequality of distribution, inadequate information, lack of
individual freedoms, or the exploitation of governmental power to ensure that politicians
enjoy a privileged existence. This category of optimists is nevertheless forced to admit,
that these disadvantages and dysfunctions are also present in capitalism with liberal
democracy, but they convince themselves that what makes the difference in favour of
liberalism is that, according to them, these negative effects are present on a smaller scale.
Unfortunately, serious drawbacks and dysfunctions, are encountered on an increasing scale
and intensity in the economies of the West. And it is difficult, if not impossible, to decide
in which of these two regimes the dysfunctions and negative features are more intense. But
it is equally difficult to answer whether or not there will continue to be differences between
these two regimes, and if so, which of them will prevail.
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Austria and Finland are moving in the same direction. “Populist” governments are
also dominating the Balkans, with the ultimate goal of permanently weakening the EU's
status. What exactly do the formerly dominant EU and the strong euro have left? A utopia,
which is soon in danger of revealing the ruins of an initially exceptional effort. The new
international economic order, lacking the prominence and strong propaganda from the
media, which was and still is enjoyed by globalization, does not attempt to impose itself as
a one-way solution or paradise like its predecessor but simply appears on the international
stage as a necessity, to limit the widespread and multidimensional ailments of
globalization.
One of the key arguments of the West in relation to its conviction that it will be
able to maintain its political status after China's international dominance, is that in the
world of the twenty-first century power is passed through globalization and international
organizations, controlled by the West itself (Zakaria and Muller). This argument, however,
has been greatly weakened by the severe blows that globalization is taking with the
introduction of protectionism and the accusations Donald Trump has launched against
international organizations and the established economic order as a whole. This argument
has also lost much of its original glamour due to the rise of populism, which expresses the
change of public opinion and which turns directly against globalization and the system
prevailing in the West, in general. Now, concerning the influence and scope of the
"populist governments" in Europe which has been invaded by them, regardless of the fact
that it still seems to be ignoring them, and pretends to still reign on the foundation of
liberal democracy. This is now clearly utopian, given that Britain has left the European
group and Italy has acquired a "populist", albeit rather weak and unstable government.
Conclusion
The question which needs to be answered is whether Liberal Democracy or
regimes regarded as authoritarian will prevail (Deudney and Ikenberry). Nowadays with
the constant threat of perpetual stagnation, the answer to the above quest should above all
investigate which of the two systems is most effective: in achieving rapid growth; in
fighting corruption; in achieving the most equitable distribution of income and wealth; in
fighting corruption; in ensuring full employment; in relation to the quality of public health
and public education services; in the protection of dietary risks; in imposing meritocracy.
Although the answers to these concerns are neither easy nor obvious at least for
the moment, the inevitable reflection around them uncovers a reality that the “nonpopulists”
of the West refuse to accept: that the issue is not so simple, nor its solutions so
obvious as they misleadingly appear but that, on the contrary, constant critical and
objective monitoring of the relevant developments is required. And that furthermore,
researchers who focus on this huge problem are neither traitors, nor right-wingers, nor
nostalgic of dictatorial regimes, nor communists.
In any case, account should be taken of the fact that populists appear to be the
product of a radical change in voter preferences, especially among young people. Indeed,
while among the older Americans, 2/3 declare their preference for Democracy, less than
1/3 of the young people care about it, while they are favourable to the idea of a totalitarian
regime and strongly critical of democracy (Mounk 2018). Let me add that two decades
before today, 25% of the British were favourable to the idea of an authoritarian
government, and they have now reached 50%. In countries like Germany, England and the
United States, the percentage of young people who favour a right or left extreme has
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doubled in the last two decades, while in Sweden it has tripled. Similar rates prevail in
countries such as Hungary, Austria, Greece and Finland (Mounk 2018). The dangerous,
and seemingly generalized, transformations of the preferences of Western voters appeared
neither automatically nor in an incomprehensible way. Unfortunately, these are the sad
consequences of the totally unsuccessful governance of traditional politicians who did not
fulfil their pre-election promises, who fermented or even participated in corruption,
who cultivated conditions of low growth and high unemployment, who did not aim to limit
the high inequalities in income and wealth distribution, who destroyed the middle class
through a series of unfortunate policy measures and more. These are the main culprits for
the retreat of democracy, the rise of extremes, the generalization of populism. The ideals of
democracy are imposed on the citizens of a country where its principles are respected and
its offenses punished. Unfortunately, these are not the conditions prevailing today in most
of the modern Western states.
Selected References
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nationalism-not bringing-nazism-america
Briefing European Populism (2018), The Economist, 03/02.
Deudney, Daniel and Ikenberry G. John (2009) "The myth of the autocratic Revival",
Foreign Affairs, January/February.
Europea Commission - Frans Timmermans and Jyrki Katainen (2017), "Paper on reducing
globalization", COM(2017) 240, 10/05.
"European populism-Threat and opportunity" (2018), The Economist, 03/02.
Hansen, Alvin (1939),"Economic Progress and Declining Population Growth", American
Economic Review, 29 (1):1-15.
Lenglet, Francois (2014), La fin de mondialisation, Librairie Arhème Fayard/Pluriel,
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Mattews, Jessica Tuchman, Andrew Kohut and Stapleton Roy (2012), “US Public, Experts
Differ on China Policies” Pew Research Center-septembre.
Mounk Yasha (2018), "How populist uprisings could bring down liberal democracy", The
Guardian, Sun 4 Mars, 07/05 GMT.
Mounk, Yascha (2018) "The people vs democracy", Harvard University Press.
Mounk, Yasha and Roberto Stefan Foa (2018), "The End of the democratic
Century",Foreign Affairs, May-June, pp. 29-36.
Muller, Jan-Werner (2018), "The trouble with illiberal democracy", International New
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Negreponti-Delivani, Maria (2014), The Cold Blooded Murder of Greece, Maria and
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Summers, Lawrence (2013) "Why Stagnation Might Prove to be the New
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Survey Monkey
Zakaria, Fareed Jan-Werner Muller (2018), "The trouble with illiberal democracy",
International New York Times, 06/04