Europe’s Fate in a Changing World

 

Maria NEGREPONTI-DELIVANIS 

University of Macedonia, Thessaloniki, Greece. 

delimar@uom.edu.gr 

Received: June 27, 2024 

Revised: July 10, 2024 

Accepted: July 15, 2024 

Published: July 25, 2024 

Abstract: The purpose of this paper is to analyze the current economic and political situation of the European Union (EU), in the given changing international landscape. The paper contains two parts. In the first part, the analysis is focused on the current problems the EU is facing now with the war between Russia and Ukraine, and the fights in Israel. Also, it is analyzed the position of the EU with respect to the USA. The most important issue is the economic gap between the Western countries and the East-South countries. That generates many frustrations in poor countries’ populations. A second significant issue is the decreasing demography of Europe. The second part of the paper focuses on the possible solutions the leaders of the EU may consider in order to align it to the initial vision of the EU founders. 

Keywords: European Union, political analysis, economic analysis, international changes, populism 

 

 

Introduction 

The inherent difficulties of the EU, and later of the Eurozone, as a result of the grave errors that sealed its constitution, precluded from the outset the possibility of realizing its initial promises (rapid growth, reduction of inequalities, full employment, peace, and monetary stability). Among the many consequences of the EU's dysfunction, the most dramatic is the rupture between the rich European North and the poor and indebted South, sealed by the Stability Pact (Negroponti-Delivanis, 2012). And in terms of the EU's position on the international stage, its complete failure to secure an independent voice and policy vis-à-vis the United States, despite having been the dominant reason for its creation. justifies the profound disappointment of its late visionary, Jacques Delors, and more. 

Despite its serious flaws, the EU has so far managed to survive and, above all, not be threatened with dissolution, at least not in the immediate future, thanks to its flexible capabilities. This is mainly due to the prudent and generally successful choice s made by the leaders of each of its member states, who accept in advance and without hesitation the task of supporting its political choices and protecting it as much as possible from whatever threatens it. Even if this blind loyalty sometimes goes agains t the interests of the individual member states, but ultimately also against its "longevity". As it turns out, these rotating leaders have so far proved capable of convincing the people of the member states that, despite the EU's ever-increasing problems, it is better to stay in the EU than to leave it. I would also add that the general and accelerating decline of the West inevitably affects the quality of EU officials. These mainly long-term consequences of the West's progressive decline have recently been aggravated by the negative effects, especially in the case of Europe, of the war in Ukraine, the Israel-Hamas war, and, more recently, the events in the Red Sea. The

How to cite 

Negroponti-Delivanis, M. (2024). Europe’s fate in a changing world. Journal of Knowledge Dynamics, Vol. 1, No.1, p17-24. https://doi.org/10.56082/jkd.2024.1.17 ISSN ONLINE 3061-2640 

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crowning glory of all these unfavorable developments is the critical situation in which  the hitherto very resilient German economy has found itself. 

And, as was to be expected, the decadent West, in addition to the negative effects that  are crushing it, has proved completely unprepared for the onslaught of the inherent  upheavals that are rapidly changing the international economic order and the  ideological bases of its governance and decisions. 

And if the specter of the EU's disintegration has so far not directly threatened it, the  trend towards increasingly unfavorable conditions for the West and for itself justifies  fears about the risks of its disintegration. In Part I of my analysis, I will address these  new threats to the EU, while in Part II I will unfold recent efforts to save the EU. Finally,  in the conclusion, I will try to summarize the pros and cons and predict, as far as  possible, the fate of the EU. 

The deadly dangerous reversals 

The EU has entered an extremely difficult period, as the persistent inefficiency of its  functioning and its often disappointing decisions are compounded by extremely  dangerous reversals, both at the national and international levels, which are  extremely dangerous for its very existence. 

Α. The new risks at the national level 

The risks to the survival of the EU are numerous and new ones are constantly being  added. The threats I have chosen to discuss below are certainly not the only ones, but  in my opinion they are the most representative. 

Populist Governments. The greatest threat to the EU, I would say without a doubt, is  the emergence and rapid expansion in Europe and the world of what  mainstream/traditional governments call populist, far-right, and non-systemic  governments. In fact, in the last 20 years or so, new parties have emerged in the  political space of Europe and beyond, with characteristics that are significantly  different from their systemic, right-wing, centrist, and left-wing counterparts. This  new trend in Europe has been observed since the end of the 2008 financial crisis. The  EU is literally terrified as it watches their rapid expansion and replacement of  traditional governments, which explains the names and labels that are being hurled at  them to mock, demean, ridicule, or even point out the supposed danger of these new  and emerging political parties. Among the labels indiscriminately hurled at these  newly formed parties are those of "far right", "populist", "conservative", "non progressive", "backward" and "dangerous to democracy". 

In this regard, I would like to emphasize that populist parties are theoretically both  right-wing and left-wing, although this classical distinction has become blurred. The  differences between them are minimal and mainly concern immigration policy. Right wing governments are critical or even hostile to the migratory wave, while left-wing  

governments are more tolerant of it (although even this difference has recently  narrowed considerably). Moreover, all non-systemic parties oppose globalization, the  elite, permanent austerity, and extreme forms of liberalism, and favor an  interventionist state to redistribute income, as well as the nation-state and traditional  values. In particular, the right and left non-systemic parties are in favor of a fairer  distribution of income and in favor of interventionism. In general, the newly formed  parties promise to do everything that the systemic parties have promised and failed  to do.

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This is because more and more governments in Europe are already in danger of not  only following in the footsteps of Hungary and Poland (Negroponti-Delivanis, 2023b),  but also proposing to leave the EU and the euro. Already 15 of the 27 EU member  states have parties whose views are shared by at least 20% of the population, so it will  no longer be Orbán who leads the disobedience, but most of Europe. The leaders of  the EU, France, and Germany, with their parties that are collectively (but in my opinion  unjustifiably) called far-right and fascist, are on their way to governing their  countries, and there is a widespread fear that Meloni of Italy is also limping along for  the time being, waiting for reinforcements to defend her original beliefs, i.e. to leave  the euro and the EU. It is precisely at this time that questions about the exact location  of the EU's sovereign power are coming to a head. The recent election in the  Netherlands of Mr. Wilders, who is likely to lead a coalition government and is  ideologically close to Marine Le Pen, has literally culminated the fears of the EU  (Negroponti-Delivanis, 2023b). The expansion and strengthening of these political  parties will certainly be reinforced by the very likely re-election of Donald Trump as  President of the United States. 

Demographics. One of the most decisive signs of the now uncontrollable decline is the  demographic decline that Europe is experiencing. Its population is shrinking by about  two million people a year and is constantly being replaced by immigrants  (Negroponti-Delivanis, 2018). By 2050 it is expected to be no more than 420 million.  Europe is thus planning its end as it ages without renewing its generations. Instead, it  is welcoming mass immigration from the Middle East, Africa, and Asia to replace the  native Europeans, bringing with them cultures with radically different values on the  relationship between the sexes, political power, culture, the economy, and the  relationship between God and man. Europe is thus disappearing through the  modernist theory of Coudenhove Kalergi. If these trends are not controlled, in the near  future, according to Coudenhove Kalergi's predictions, the population of Europe will  turn into something resembling ancient Egyptians with black hair and a big nose  (Negroponti-Delivanis, 2012a). 

Β. The dangers ahead at the international level 

But also in the international arena, inherent reversals are taking place, preparing the  succession of world domination, namely the end of the hegemony of the West and the  rise of the secular power of the South (or, otherwise, of the East). Despite these  undeniable developments, Mr. Biden insists on perceiving American leadership of the  world as secure for the distant future as well. 

The New International Order. Within two years (2009-2011), a group of non-Western  countries created BRICS. Initially, there were five countries, namely Brazil, Russia,  India, China, and South Africa, to which five more have recently been added, namely  Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Ethiopia, and Iran, with others in the  queue, the first being Indonesia. All these states, without having specific and, above  all, common positions at the moment, are nevertheless taking a general stance against  the West, accusing it of unilateralism and heralding the advent of a new international  order. The dominant element of this emerging new order will be multilateral rather  than unilateral governance of the world. From this new order comes the promise of  its future leaders that there will no longer be an effort to satisfy and serve only the  interests of the great powers, but instead there will be respect and equality for all  countries of the world, their cultures, and religions, according to the Chinese  president.

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The BRICS are already attracting more than 20 new member states from the Global  South. By contrast, the West is having obvious difficulties in attracting new members  and imposing its views. The failure of the G20 meeting in New Delhi on September 10  to reach an agreement on the content of a statement at the end of the meeting, in which  the West insisted that only Russia should be condemned for the war in Ukraine and  that Ukraine should be exonerated, can be seen as evidence of the subversive  processes at the international level. In the end, the will of the countries of the South  prevailed, and the relevant statement attributed equal responsibility for the war to  Russia and Ukraine (Foy, Reed, Politi & Leahy, 2023). It should also be noted that no  country outside the West imposed sanctions against Russia, while the war in Ukraine  accelerated the division between the West and the South. On the basis of 30 polls, in  which 137 countries or 97% of the world's population participated, it can be  concluded that the war in Ukraine has divided the world into two camps of roughly  equal quantitative strength, the first being pro-American and anti-Russian, the second  being pro-Russian or neutral but still anti-Western. It goes without saying that the  pro-Western populations belong to the category of economically advanced countries,  while the pro-Russian populations belong to the category of developing countries. 

This division seems to be mainly ideological, since the West claims to serve liberal  democracy, with respect for the values of individual freedom, while the South has  generally embraced forms of illiberal democracy. However, liberal democracy, even  though conflicts are waged in its name to bring deviant populations under its sway,  represents an increasingly smaller percentage of the world's population and could be  seen as a consequence of the West's declining influence, as are the findings that follow.  In particular, relevant research concludes that the percentage of the world's  population living under conditions of illiberal democracy will be 46% in 2012 and  72% in 2022. It is also interesting to note that in Europe, 62% of the population is  against Russia, but not against China. Moreover, 62% declare that they would like to  remain neutral in the event of a conflict between the USA and China (Caldwell, 2023). 

Europe's position. The war in Ukraine has revealed the serious weaknesses of the  European economy, due to its high dependence on Russian energy, its lack of an  economic policy independent of that of the USA, and its own weaknesses in  modernization, especially in the field of new technologies (Erlanger & Satariano,  2020). Moreover, the 60-year-old friendship between France and Germany, the  founding fathers of the EU, has been severely damaged. For example, Macron's  proposal to adopt a European defense policy was ignored by Germany because the  latter turned to the United States and not to France to ensure its defense with F-35  planes, and also because Germany, ignoring France, announced its unilateral decision  to spend 200E billion to cope with high energy costs. 

One of the most serious consequences of the war in Ukraine is, therefore, the  realization by each of the countries of Europe that peace is not a given, as they had  naively believed before the war in Ukraine, and that it is, therefore, necessary for each  country to take care of its defense. Thus, instead of taking care of its development,  which has been limping along for 12 years, Europe is spending heavily on defense  (Cohen & Alderman, 2023). In 2022 in particular, and for the eighth year in a row,  global defense spending will be higher than at any time since the Cold War. It is  estimated to amount to 2.2% of world GDP. In Europe, the main producers of military  equipment are the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy and Spain. In order to ease  their consciences, the countries that supply Kiev with military equipment sign the 

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following declaration: "To carry arms in a country that is defending itself legitimately  is not to be belligerent” (Leymaire, 2024). 

Moreover, the fact that the sanctions against Russia ultimately did not affect Europe  at all should be considered a serious moral and economic blow for Europe. This is  because Russia was able to quickly channel oil and gas to the East, but also because it  was thoroughly prepared for similar sanctions even from Crimea in 2014 (Negroponti Delivanis, 2022). On the contrary, Europe suffered serious blows that are expected to  be long-lasting, as it was forced to reduce its gas consumption by 50-60 cubic meters,  mainly in its industrial sector, which resulted in a reduction of its competitiveness. As  a result, many European companies have closed down, while others have relocated to  the United States or Eurasia. In several cases, moreover, the resumption of coal  production was considered inevitable in Europe, even though it was highly risky for  green growth. 

Europe's inability to foresee the disastrous consequences of sanctions against Russia  and the unhesitating application of the corresponding US options are reflected in the  critical situation in which the flagship of the European economy, Germany, has found itself. Unfortunately, it seems inevitable that the harsh standards of the new  international order, which are harsh for Europe, do not leave much room for optimism,  but neither does it leave much hope that Europe, if it adopts a more successful strategy  for the future, will be able to reverse the decline of its international importance. 

Beyond the current picture, which is spontaneously projected into the future, serious  predictions for the not-too-distant future, say 2050, lead us to a new, perhaps painful  reality, which no effort on our part seems capable of changing. In fact, according to  serious predictions for 2050, the top of the world will no longer be dominated by  America, but by China, followed immediately by India, and only in third place by  America. In terms of the percentage of each country's GDP in 2050, compared to 2016,  China will have risen from 18% to 20% and India from 7% to 15%. In contrast, the EU 27 will have shrunk from 15% to 9% and the US from 16% to 12%. Moreover, in 2040,  no European country, and certainly not the US, will be in the G7 of the world's most  powerful countries. The G7 of 2015 (US, UK, France, Germany, Japan, Canada and Italy)  will be replaced by the G7 of China, India, Indonesia, Brazil, Russia, Mexico and Turkey. 

Recent EU Rescue Efforts 

Although, by all appearances, Europe failed to anticipate the rapid changes in the  economic landscape in time, it is not accepting the reality that is unfavorable to it, as  several indications show. In fact, Europe is not discouraged. One of the first reac tions  of Europe to its marginalization is the attempt to build a new nationalism. 

Α. Resorting to outdated solutions 

The EU is making significant revisions to its original ideological preferences, including  adopting protectionist measures in its international trade, in an attempt to increase  its degree of self-sufficiency at home, but also promoting state intervention in the  economy, in areas such as green growth, among others, in order not to lag behind  other countries outside Europe. Beyond these efforts, however, it is worth  highlighting the truly desperate attempt to revive a period of industrialization that  began in the United States, where 5% of GDP has already been spent in this direction.  It was only to be expected that Europe would follow in a broader effort to reduce its  dependence, thanks to an increase in the degree of self-sufficiency and the creation of 

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new jobs. For Europe in particular, it is hoped that these efforts will increase the share  of industrial production to 25% of value added. Although it is difficult to predict the  results of this unorthodox effort, the very different conditions of today compared to  those of the period of industrialization considerably limit optimistic expectations. 

B. Adoption of non-democratic methods 

In recent years, Germany, with the support of the powerful economies of northern  Europe, has sought to eliminate the right of veto within the EU at all costs, in order to  make its decisions supposedly faster and easier (Negroponti-Delivanis, 2023b). The  existence of this democratic instrument was still a source of irritation, despite the  serious mutilation it suffered in the process. The maintenance of the veto, even in this  weakened form, seems to be due to the fear of serious reactions from the South, and  not only from the "bad boys" of Europe (see Hungary and, until recently, Poland).  These, in principle, justified hesitations on the part of the EU's governing body were  dispelled in the blink of an eye in order to urgently secure the accession of Ukraine  and Moldova to the EU. In other words, the possibility that the accession of these  countries, and not only their accession, could be jeopardized by the veto of certain  member states was considered unacceptable. 

Let me remind you that on November 2, 2002, 17 foreign ministers and 11 state  secretaries met in Berlin at the invitation of the Foreign Minister. They were mainly  representatives of the European North, but also representatives of candidate  countries such as Ukraine and Turkey. The main topic of this meeting was the abolition  of unanimity in favor of a special majority, which was in fact the prologue to the  abolition of the veto. 

The effective abolition of the veto was achieved by a resolution and under the  umbrella of the immediate need to reform the EU treaties in order to "face the future  of an enlarged Europe". 267 proposals for revision were presented. The most  widespread are those that reinforce the promiscuity within the EU and further limit  the reach of the poor South vis-à-vis the rich West. The absence of any reaction from  the European South against the hasty decision to abolish it is surprising. It is  understandable to be surprised by the inexplicable of the only democratic weapon still  at its disposal. 

C. Enlargement 

The enlargement of the EU from 27 to 36 members, to which the EU is now rushing  (abolition of the veto), is justified by the hope that the abolition of the veto will  facilitate decision-making. However, France's concerns that the large number of  members could make the system unmanageable do not seem to have been taken  seriously. It is believed that the nine additional members will be admitted to the EU  on a fast-track basis so as not to continue to be exposed to the risk of Russian  influence. In particular, it is felt that the accession of Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia  should be accelerated because Russian troops on their territory threaten to  destabilize Europe. The EU therefore considers it inconceivable that their accession to  the EU should be jeopardized or even prevented by a possible veto by Hungary or  Poland. It should be noted, however, that not all EU candidates enjoy the same degree  of sympathy: Serbia, a candidate since 2012, has been denied entry on the grounds  that it has not fulfilled the necessary reforms. And according to polls, a significant  portion of the population there no longer wants membership. However, the  tumultuous changes in Europe's political space raise the agonizing question of how  and whether the EU can finally be saved by lifting the veto, ridding it of recalcitrant 

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members like Hungary and Poland, and enlarging it. This is because it is being flooded  by the new non-systemic political parties. 

Incidentally, it is worth noting that these new political parties are collectively labeled  as extreme right-wing by their political opponents, i.e. the mainstream parties, in  order to exclude and stigmatize all forms of party nationalism. Precisely for thi s  reason, efforts are being made so that the labels neo-Nazi and neo-fascism are now  used exclusively for parties and groups that explicitly declare their desire to restore  the Third Reich or cite historical National Socialism as their ideological influenc e. They are therefore not "fascist" and "right-wing extremist" parties or governments, as  traditional governments, panicked by their rise, like to call them. On the contrary, they  are political formations, with non significant differences between them, belonging to  the right as well as to the left, and whose name is appropriately called "anti-systemic".  They promise, if they come to power, to do everything that the systemic/traditional  governments have failed to do. The already visible danger for the EU, however, is the  fact that many of these new parties have promised that if they come to power they will  hold a referendum on leaving the EU and the euro. 

Conclusion 

The proliferating and intensifying dangers surrounding the future of the EU cannot be  addressed by abolishing the veto, nor by enlargement, nor by a shift to less democratic  and more authoritarian methods. On the contrary, I would argue that the EU would  face fewer problems in number and severity if it tried more decisively and effectively  to resolve its chronic and thorny problems, including: a) its absolute dependence on  the U.S., whose interests do not always coincide with European interests; b) the  growing inequalities between the North and the South of Europe; c) finding (although  difficult) a less dangerous institutional framework than the Stability Pact for the  management of the euro, which does not condemn the EU to permanent austerity and  therefore economic stagnation; d) to tackle the migratory wave in a collective manner  for the whole of Europe, ensuring equal opportunities and risks for all Member States;  e) ensure a higher degree of democracy in practice and not just in theory, which would  require a referendum on all serious, controversial and sensitive issues. 

Apart from the above observations/suggestions, it is of course necessary to recall that,  given that Europe is part of the wider West, there seems to be no other evolutionary  path than the one that would drag the whole West into decline. Civilizations are not  eternal and the maximum time limit of their existence is about 200 years. However,  the current status quo can continue for decades, during which it is necessary to  address the problems of the EU and try to solve them as far as possible. 

References 

Caldwell, C. (2023). U.S. Tactics for bullying the world. INYT 0.6. 

Cohen, P. & Alderman, L. (2023), Europe's peace dividend's disappearing. The New  York Times International Edition, 15/5. 

Erlanger, S. & Satariano, A. (2020). Europe is left out of U.S.-China tech battle. The New  York Times International Edition, 14/9. 

Foy, H., Reed, J., Politi, J. & Leahy, J. (2023). G20 statement drops reference to Russia  "aggression" against Ukraine. Financial Times, London, 9/9. 

Leymaire, P. (2024). La guerre en Ukraine, grand accelerateur de l'armement  mondial. Le Monde Diplomatique, January.

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