THE POPULIST POLITICAL PARTIES AND THEIR OVERTHROW IN THE PREVALENT ORDER*** Maria NEGREPONTI-DELIVANIS University of Macedonia, Thessaloniki, Greece delimar@uom.edu.gr
THE
POPULIST POLITICAL PARTIES AND THEIR OVERTHROW IN THE PREVALENT ORDER***
Maria NEGREPONTI-DELIVANIS
University
of Macedonia, Thessaloniki, Greece
delimar@uom.edu.gr
Abstract:
Keywords:nationalism, liberal democracy, populist parties, globalization,
protectionism, interventionism, totalitarian regime
JEL Classification: F,B
Introduction
Over
the last few years, the West has been gradually entering into uncharted waters.
The familiar, the safe and the traditional retreats at a dizzying speed, and is
been substituted by the unknown, the subversive and the threatening. Already,
globalization, which has been with us for almost fifty years, is forced to give
up its sovereignty not only to protectionism but also to an intensifying trade
war. It could be argued that this shift, between the freedom of trade and the
enforcement of trade controls, is part of the fundamental changes, which are to be expected approximately every 40 to 50 years[1], so that it does not justify particular concern. However, this is not
the case with other kinds of upheavals that have recently invaded our lives,
which can be clearly distinguished from what used to be in the past. It is
precisely these characteristics that make the new international order
unsearchable, while at the same time seeming to abolish very strong traditional
distinctions, such as that between the right and left economic policies. These
upheavals adopt choices of anti-globalization, such as the revival of
nationalism, which was particularly hateful during the period of globalization,
and was almost equated with fascist attitudes.
Nationalism
is now rapidly gaining ground, and in conjunction with some additional
significant changes, it seems to be the harbinger of the endangered end of all
Western civilization. As our own culture has dominated the West for many
decades, the idea that it alone represents the ideal and unique world order has
been consolidated. Prevalent is the belief that the liberal democracy which
after World War II is represented and guarded by the United States , is eternal,
unchangeable and irreplaceable. Unfortunately, however, in recent years, the
advanced centers of this western culture have projected an irrefutable picture
of general decline in all aspects of social, economic and cultural life.
According to all evidence, we are witnessing the end of the era of Western
civilization, as happened in the past with all the previous ones, following the
same prescribed route. That is, civilizations emerge, reign and die[2]. As nothing in our world is everlasting, civilizations prevail over
circles of 200-250 years, then giving their place to others[3]
that emerge through their ashes. The end of Western civilization seems to
coincide with the end of growth or the entry of advanced economies into the
stage of perpetual stagnation, reviving Alvin Hansen's old theory[4], thanks to its update by Lawrence Summers and his team[5].
In
this article I will deal with only some of the transversal developments that
shook the Western world, focusing on the economic and regulatory field, which
have as their point of reference the emergence, empowerment and generalization
of new political parties, clearly distinct from the traditional. These are
called "populist" by the panicking traditional politicians.
In
Part I of this paper, I will try to outline the basic characteristics of these
newly established political parties as well as the main causes of their
appearance, while in Part II I will try to highlight the economic form and
status of the new world, which is expected to emerge from the prevalence of
"populist parties".
I. Populist political parties
Populism
dates back to 1980, and since then has grown steadily, reinforced by
globalization, the 2008 crisis, unprecedented large inequalities, rising
corruption in political life, mass immigration, and terrorism. Based on a
recent Tony Blair Institute survey[6], populist votes
in 2000 were, on average, 8.5% in each US state, and in 2017 they climbed
to 24.1% respectively[7].
What
definition would you give to populism? Jan-Werner Müller[8] attempts to answer as follows: It addresses "a morally pure and
fully united people, betrayed by select, deeply corrupt, and somewhat morally
inferior people."
I.1.The causes of populism
I.1.1.The effects of globalization
A
recent study[9] attributes
populism to low growth rates on a global scale. Naturally, this can be seen as
a general but not fully satisfactory explanation. Because, although there was
an anemic growth after 1985, if its distribution had followed regular and not
unacceptable forms of inequality, it would probably not have evolved into
populism.
Several
years before the recent and rapid spread of populism, a series of indications
warns of the end of globalization and of entering a new international economic
order with features such as "protectionism", "nationalism",
"controlled borders", "respect for traditions",
"interventionism", "anti-globalization" and so on.
Anti-globalization,
which nourished populism, is the result of the wrath of the losers and the
marginalized because of the consequences of globalization. All of the suffering
that has affected most of humanity, with the predominant problem of
uncontrolled inequality of distribution, income and wealth that haunts the
world, has been attributed to globalization. Thus, when the public realized
that globalization did not keep its initial promise to "ensure the
prosperity of all the inhabitants of Earth", but instead proved to be the
system that caused few winners and piles of losers, it turned directly against
it, as evidenced by the following selected points:
Based
on estimates, around 65% of Europeans are in favor of restricting freedom of
trade, or in other words, in favor of de-globalization. However, the highest
rates dissatisfied with the effects of globalization are to be found in the United States , where 71% of citizens are worried
about job losses due to trade with China ,
while 78% consider America 's
financial dependence on China
to be a very serious issue[10]. By contrast, only 15% of America's big entrepreneurs declare that they
are against globalization, a result that obviously strengthens the conclusion
of "few winners and numerous losers". Moreover, a recent study by the
European Commission[11], which expresses the anxiety about the reduction and the future of
globalization, also highlights a number of poll results, about how Europeans
see globalization, and through it, the EU which represents a smaller
globalization within it. With obvious perplexity, the European Commission
aknowledges these results, according to which 53% of Europeans are deeply
concerned, and consider the EU as a threat to their identity. Only 41% of
Europeans trust the EU, although this percentage is higher than the
corresponding one\ showing their confidence in individual national governments[12]. 52% of the votes in Great Britain ,
in favor of Brexit, is certainly the biggest proof of this shift in public
opinion, against globalization, in Europe .
This shift is explained, to a significant extent, by the fact that "the
working class in advanced economies (which largely represented the Brexit
voters) witnessed a very low income increase during the entire long-term period
of globalization[13]". The level
of wages, in advanced economies, which had their trade frontiers open to
emerging economies, was almost reduced to that prevailing in the latter. The
effect of globalization on the USA
(and, of course, not only) was the increase in the trade deficit and the loss
of five million jobs over the past twenty years[14].
I.1.2.The rise of
nationalism
The
general criticism against populist parties, which, however, does not correspond
to reality is their collective ranking to the far-right in political terms.
Although this criticism, is justified by a small proportion of these parties,
it represents however, the easy reaction of all those whose interests are
affected by the decline of globalization. The core of this criticism seems to
relate to the fact that all these emerging parties raise to the surface the
concept of nationalism which had been forgotten, for years, receding under the
covert preparations for the advent of a global government[15]. Nationalism is now attempted wrongly, in an arbitrary and
unjustifiable way, to be equated with far-right political choices. However, if
nationalism is not extreme, in the sense that it encourages hatred for other
nations or different races, it is entirely acceptable. Because it is
unthinkable to comfortably brand someone belonging to the far-right, who loves
his country and is proud of it as a nationalist. The widespread tendency today
to collectively dismiss all nationalists as far right and fascists, is suspicious,
dangerous and problematic because it obviously conceals unspoken goals.
Obviously and unfortunately there is the problem of rising fascism with its
abominable and dark activity, especially in Europe. Against the serpent's eggs,
urgent action is needed, but the solution does not lie in condemning the new
political parties, within which the fascist tendencies are, fortunately, not
the norm.
Already,
an attempt is made to demote the content of nationalism as it evolves into a
central feature of the new international economic order, as confirmed by the
following statements:
· Lawrence Summers[16]: "The political challenge in many countries is the development of a
responsible nationalism that rests on a policy that favors local interests and
indigenous more and above cosmopolitan aspirations."
· Michael Barone[17]: "Trump and
his nationalism with "First America" are not necessarily bad.
Also:" It is good to prefer one's country to another."
"Nationalism can to be a positive force". "Being proud of one’s
homeland and all that is relevant to it is not selfish and certainly not
racist. It is patriotism and a natural reaction for a normal citizen."
· And social psychologist Jonathan Haidt
Haidt[18]: "Nationalists feel tied to
their homeland and are proud to be part of it. Globalizers want to wipe out the
borders of each country and get rid of democracy."
I.1.3.The search for greater security
Moreover,
the rise of nationalism is due to the widespread desire, in advanced and
emerging economies, for more security and less risk, compared to the
globalization regime. Satisfying these trends requires a restriction on
absolute freedom of trade and a return to market regulation, which has been abolished
in the globalization era. It also requires removal from the obsessions of the
"invisible hands" of classics, supposedly regulating the market, and,
at the same time, reconciliation with the need for state intervention in the
economy. The borders, which have been virtually abolished by globalization, are
again desirable, as they guarantee greater security. In these choices of the
new international economic order, the contribution of the migratory stream,
accompanied by many and unresolved aspects, was extremely important.
I.2.The dominant features of populist parties:
I.2.1.Right and left-hand politics
Populist
political parties belong to both the right and the left, and are distinguished
by numerous differences in their choices. However, their basic characteristics
meet in almost all the so-called "populist parties" and explain why
their appearance in the world has virtually deactivated the distinction between
left and right politics.
At
the moment, and although the relevant scene is constantly changing, as new
populist parties are added to the existing ones, the left wing includes the
National Party of Scotland, Podemos in Spain, Die Linke in Germany, and before
being completely subservient to the demands of lenders, Syriza in Greece. The
right side of populism comprises in turn the second largest political party in
Finland, the third most important political party in Sweden, the party of
Viktor Orban, re-elected for the fourth time in Hungary, the party of the
National Front of Marine Le Pen in France and the Alternative party in Germany,
which is expected to be second in the upcoming next elections. Moreover, the
results of the elections of 4 March 2018 in Italy turn directly against the
"system" and should be expected to mark the beginning of the end of
the EU and, of course, the euro. The demoralizingly low 18.1% of Matteo Renzi's
pro-European party is overwhelmingly eloquent about the wrath of voters against
the European course and its choices.
The
above-mentioned populist governments obviously belong to the United States and
China, both of which present additional features in comparison to the general
ones, are at the top of the global pyramid, and the United States is fighting
to preserve world sovereignty, and China for its acquisition. But, Russia, in
spite of the quirks of its governance also belongs to the general category of
countries with populist government. Furthermore, it is possible to add
governments that were helped to come to power by populist parties such as the
case of Austria, Bulgaria, Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands, Norway and
Latvia.
Despite
the differences between right-wing and left-wing populist parties as well as
hybrids, all of them coincide with several common choices, such as
anti-globalization, nationalism, state interventionism, an attempt to achieve
prosperity for all, opposition to elitism and the established order, opposition
to long-term austerity policies, and opposition to the extreme forms of the
stock market economy.
The
emerging populism of our days is directed generally against elitism,
traditional politics and dominant institutions, national and international, in
a word against the established order. Populism represents the ordinary citizen,
who thinks that he was forgotten and betrayed by his politicians. Populism
proclaims that it expresses genuine patriotism. Its proponents are angry at the
behavior of politicians and the general breach of their promises. The vote for
Donald Trump is interpreted as a voter's desire to leave behind the bad
political past of globalization.
Apart
from the convergence of the two populist political movements on most important
goals, it is interesting to note that, in particular, the right-wing populist
side has broken its relations with traditional assumptions of its faction, such
as the opposition towards state intervention in the economy, as well as the
belief in continued austerity. The choice of Donald Trump, as well as of
several other European politicians close to power, is based precisely on their
promises to abandon globalization, in favor of protectionism, as well as the
abandonment of dogmatic neo-liberalism.
I.2.2.The differences in the preferences between right-wing and left-wing
populist parties
The
pair of choices of the new international economic order, as proclaimed at
least, appears under a seemingly new label: open and closed borders. This is
certainly not a new distinction, but
merely a verbal evolution of the ever-existing divide between the status of
freedom of international trade and that of protectionism, or even more
recently, between globalization and border nationalism. Although the
continuation of the traditional distinction between deregulation and regulation
of international trade, even under different titles, seems to face no problems,
these do emerge however, since attempts are made to classify their individual
choices into the two traditional political parties, right and left. Indeed,
there is a prevalent view that the
traditional right is attached to economic liberalism and to all the individual
terms that follow it, such as the liberalization of international trade, the
free movement of capital and labor, the non-intervention of the state in the
economy, minimizing the tax burden, as well as the abolition of the welfare
state. And there is the additional hostility to mass immigration. On the
contrary, the main features of the traditional left have so far been the
acceptance of the role and importance of state interventionism, extending to
the regulation of international trade conditions, the recognition of the
advantages of cooperation and complementarity between the public and private
sectors, considered to be of equal importance , paying special attention to the
welfare state services, the establishment of labor rights, recognized as the
weakest factor of production, in relation to capital, as well as the imposition
of progressive taxation, which aims at a fairer distribution of income.
Supplementary but less secure discrimination between the left and the right
concerns the area of economic policy choices. The right, which is recognized as
the most conservative, generally seeks to achieve balance everywhere. Its
relations with microeconomic policy, which regulates and encourages private
initiative, is more visible and narrower, while being less clear with
macroeconomic policy. This explains the attachment of the right to austerity
policies, but also the preference for monetary policy, with the exclusion of
fiscal policy.
However,
the above-mentioned indicative distinctions and economic policy preferences
have recently been overturned. Apart from the clear opposition to the
continuation of globalization, this new hybrid form of political parties, some
of which are close to power, is an unsafe and unstable amalgam of piecemeal
traditional economic policy preferences, both left and right. Hence the
difficulty of classifying them as left or right wing. This is why the argument,
put forward by various sides, is reinforced that the distinction between right
and left no longer exists, at least in its traditional form.
Despite
these obvious difficulties of ranking the populist parties to the right or to
the left, their decisive common element is their intense hostility to open
borders. It is precisely this hostility, which has proved to be a powerful
weapon for attracting supporters, from the newly established political parties
in Europe, and not only. The increasingly rising number of voters from these
parties, characterized by their political opponents as pro-conservative and
anachronistic, is opposed to the continuation of the liberalization of
international trade or the reception of refugees / immigrants on their
territory, or as a rule against both of these policies belonging to the policy
of open borders. The followers of these political parties are convinced, not
always for the same reasons, that the opening of borders, either to products or
to people, is detrimental to the national economy and its inhabitants, and that
is why they are also seen as nationalist parties .
I.2.3.Concerns about the rise of "populist parties"
The
rise of populist political parties can be explained by the
"diversity" of the positions they express and support, compared to
the positions of those who have been in power for the past fifty years and
which are generally rejected by an increasing proportion of the world’s
inhabitants.
That
is why these new political parties also pose a clear risk to traditional
politicians, who view them with surprise, discomfort and panic, as they
threaten their multifaceted and strongly vested interests.
The
criticism of traditional politicians against the populist parties, focuses
mainly on the fundamental issue of the current government, which is likely to
be overthrown and less on the individual economic policy measures. Indeed, a
significant part of the European population, and not only, already states with
no hesitation that it does not perceive the regime of "liberal
democracy" as a unique or undisputedly optimum form of governance of the
contemporary world economies. It is a reality for Europe that the traditional
right-wing and left-wing political parties are rapidly shrinking significantly,
gradually giving their place to new political parties, which are anti-European
and favor the re-establishment of the nation-state. This has also happened in France
and Germany, although the EU expressed its relief because these so-called
populist parties did not come into power. However, any EU triumph over the
recent election results of its members is totally unfounded, as the power of
non-traditional parties is steadily expanding. In France for example and in
spite of Emmanuel Macron’s victory in the last elections, traditional left and
right parties ranked third and fifth, respectively, while in Germany, and in
spite of Angela Merkel's dominance, the two traditional political parties
shrinked from 67% in 2013 to no more than 53% in October 2017. These new
European parties, which are targeting the EU and the euro are obviously
panicking Europe and causing her to look for ways of survival which, for the
time being cannot be considered as successful. These European citizens,
collectively and contemptuously called "populists," have separated
their choices from those recognized as orthodox within the EU and falling
within the broad area of "Liberal Democracy".
The
European "populists" are seemingly convinced that the EU is deeply
confused when applying policies that are sure to destroy it, such as the
admission to its territories of mass immigration and the abandonment of
national sovereignty and patriotism, history and national traditions. The
abandonment in other words, of the national identity of the individual
nation-states. The EU monitors with resentment and also growing concern about
the rapid spread of populists on its territory, but has not yet been self-critical
about how and why its basic guidelines are being abandoned by an increasing
number of its citizens. At this point it is very important to note that the
European "populists" are not alone in their actual refusal of being
wiped out and accepting a global governance at a later date, as everything
seems to point in that direction within the EU. This is obviously how we should
interpret this wave of reclaiming and rescuing the national identity which,
with many variations in its details, has invaded not only Europe but the world
as a whole. This refers to Donald Trump’s America, Putin's Russia, Xi Jinping’s
China, and also Latin American and African governments.
Ending
Part I of this paper, the general conclusion that emerges from the above
analysis is the stormy change of regimes in Europe and the world that
jeopardizes the maintenance of Liberal Democracy but at the same time also
comprises the innovations in economic, political and social life which modern
societies are in vital need of, in order to be able to give new solutions to
their numerous and thorny problems.
II. The new face of
advanced economies
The
content of this Part II refers to the future economic and political conditions
that will be incorporated into future societies. Dealing with future
predictions necessarily involves a high risk of discrediting them. However,
this content of Part II, I believe, for the most part, has a high probability
for realization, precisely because the twists and turns it refers to have
already begun and are progressing without being hampered in their course.
Although,
for the moment, there is dense smoke around the form, which will eventually be
taken by individual national economies, as the elements comprising the
international scene are still in progress, one thing is certain: globalization
is limiting its scope and nothing will ever be the same again.
The
expected changes will be summarized, first of all, in their economic dimension,
paragraph A, and secondly in their political status, paragraph B.
II.1.In the economic sphere
II.1.1.National economies
The
end of globalization and the establishment of protectionism currently seem to be accelerating due to the
choices of the new US president. Donald Trump's clear preference for closed
borders, which he has announced, passed
and partly implemented, is a trigger for a parallel course in the rest of the
world. In other words, it consists of opposing and refusing to compromise with
what has generally been the policy of traditional governments. Developing new
guidelines everywhere. In particular, the opposition towards any form of
restriction of national sovereignty, the re-establishment of the nation-state
with increased intervention in the economy, the viewing of international
organizations with suspicion, the diminishing of the importance of the stock
market in favor of the real economy, the reluctance to welcome immigrants /
refugees , and naturally the condemnation of all thoughts of creation of a
global government, are the preferences of the American planetary master.
Already
every national economy suffers the consequences of its return to reality, its
possibilities and its weaknesses. It is guarded by the application of
protective measures on its trade, but it also suffers from the consequences of
a raging commercial war, which however has not yet acquired its final form.
Anti-globalization
is the product of the reaction of the weakest of the planet, especially those
who have been deprived of jobs because of the liberalization of international
trade, or have suffered a deterioration in their standard of living due to wage
competition by immigrants / refugees. That is why there is hope, thanks to the
new international economic order, to reverse the unfavorable effect of
globalization, which consisted of few winners and numerous losers. It is also
hoped that the positive consequences of this overthrow will counteract the
negative effects of the commercial war. Thus, anti-globalization, does not
attempt to be imposed as a one-way solution or as a paradise like its predecessor,
but merely appears on the international scene as a need to reduce the
widespread and multidimensional calamities of globalization.
II.2.Statutory change / governance
II.2.1. The Liberal
Republic is retreating
towards "illiberal" Democracy
Postwar
America has emerged as the richest, most powerful and most successful country
in the world. Her marvelous achievements in all areas have been aligned with
her liberal democratic constitution, which has been gradually adopted by most
of the globally advanced world. Countries without Democracy and under
authoritarian regimes were marginalized, with lower per capita income and
slower economic growth. Liberal Democracy has prevailed in the past decades as
the political regime which would ultimately have to be adopted by all countries
in the world, as soon as they managed to secure a satisfactory annual per
capita income, estimated at around $ 14,000. Liberal Democracy countries have
thus become a "model to be imitated," and democracy has been recognized
as the ideal government, meant to eternally prevail on earth and gradually
absorb all non-democratic and authoritarian regimes.
In
addition to the high standard of living characterizing post-war economies with
liberal Democracy, the latter also presented three enviable conditions[19]:
· relative equity,
· fast - growing income for all citizens, and
· the fact that countries with non-democratic status were generally less
prosperous.
Until
the recent election of Donald Trump, western civilization did not recognize any
other regime apart from that of liberal democracy which it tried to impose on
the whole planet, even resorting to war. Indeed, one of the basic excuses put
forward by Bush jr. for the unjustified wars against Iraq, Afghanistan, etc.,
was the need to "democratize" them. The notion that liberal Democracy
with capitalism is the only system that produces wealth and power was
reinforced by the collapse of existing socialism, since there was no longer an
opponent.
All
these foundations and advantages for the perpetuation
and imitation of democracy by non-democratic countries however, have been
eroded. And the most important thing is that, it turns out beyond any doubt,
that the regimes considered as authoritarian achieve faster growth rates than
democracies. Indeed, out of the 15 economies world economies now showing the
fastest growth rates, 2/3 do not have liberal democratic regimes[20]. In addition, out of the 250 best universities in the world, 16 belong
to non-liberal democratic countries[21].
The
change brought on by Donald Trump's new international financial order is very
important, although it has so far gone unnoticed. The new president, according
to all indications, seems to have forsaken the right or more correctly the
obligation of the US to impose democracy on the rest of the world, as the only
regime that can be reconciled with capitalism and which was imposed immediately
after the end of the Second World War. The abandonment of this fundamental goal
of American liberal hegemony changes America's self-imposed regime towards the
outside world, from "liberal democracy" to "illiberal
hegemony"[22] or even
"illiberal democracy"[23, or even
"Democracy without Rights". This change was deemed necessary because
America had a lot of failures in this area and, moreover, with the rise of the
so-called populist parties all over the world, even more failures are to be
expected in the future. Beyond these failures, given that China, Russia,
Poland, Hungary, Turkey, etc. do not have liberal democratic regimes, the US's
insistence on continuing to impose it (even if is recognized as the best
regime) often in non-democratic ways in the past, even including armed
conflicts, would be irrelevant.
II.2.2.The new regime under populist political parties
The
impossibility of imposing democracy on countries that do not want it has been
fully understood with the economic rise of China , which has embraced
capitalism, but combined with the imposition of an authoritarian regime that
has become more prominent with the lifelong reign of its president in power.
The same development is witnessed in Russia, and not only, since similar
widespread trends concerning populist and hybrid political parties have been
recently prevailing in Europe, as already mentioned in this Paper. It turns out
that capitalism can coexist not only with democracy but also with different
regimes. There is also proof that democracy, at least under western standards,
is gradually shrinking, since it is the system governing an increasingly
smaller population of the world, but also the system that has ceased to meet
its original specifications, namely those of the ancient Greeks. So, it
becomes quite frightening to answer the
question: "What part of the world is still the home of liberal
democracy?"
II.2.3.The decline of Liberal Democracy
Sadly,
the liberal democratic regime of the West is in great decline. And the simple
invocation of democracy, when it coexists with completely incompatible
consequences, is not enough to satisfy relevant concerns. I have the
increasingly strong feeling that references to democracy are being used as a form of diversion for a series of daily crimes
performed in her name. And I ultimately believe that the guarantees given
through the simple reference to Democracy only serve as a form of reassurance
and resignation from trying to find solutions to difficult problems. Thus, they
often end up in unacceptable situations. Situations, which ultimately do not
differ from those corresponding to authoritarian regimes, which do not invoke
democracy. Let me emphasize, on this point, that even the citizens of countries
with democratic regimes do not have enough confidence in them. Relevant
research in America ,
which is probably the country where the advantages of democracy are mostly
being proclaimed, as opposed to all the unpleasantness prevailing in countries
without democracy, reveals that 45% of the respondents have doubts about the
positive aspects of the democratic government and have little or no confidence
in it[24]. Undoubtedly, democracy has taken a
resounding slap from globalization and the uncontrolled inequalities it has led
to.
The
question here is whether this coexistence of capitalism with an illiberal
democracy is viable and therefore sustainable on a long-term basis, or whether
the conflicts inherent in this combination will lead to its dissolution,
reverting to capitalism with liberal Democracy or socialism. Opinions differ on
this very crucial point for the future of the West and the world. Those whom I
would describe as optimistic argue that authoritarian regimes can only survive
in poor economies, such as China, Russia or even Turkey, while on the other
hand, when per capita income increases and the middle class dominates, citizens
will demand political liberalism. Although according to this view capitalism,
in the long run, eliminates totalitarianism, it is not possible to determine in
advance the exact timing of such a development. However, it is certain that
political liberalism will ultimately prevail, due to contradictions and
dysfunctions of totalitarian capitalism, such as corruption, inequality of
distribution, inadequate information, lack of individual freedoms, or the
exploitation of governmental power to
ensure that politicians enjoy a privileged existence. This category of
optimists is nevertheless forced to admit, that these disadvantages and
dysfunctions are also present in capitalism with liberal democracy, but they
convince themselves that what makes the difference in favor of liberalism is
that, according to them, these negative effects are present on a smaller scale.
Unfortunately, serious drawbacks and dysfunctions, are encountered on an
increasing scale and intensity in the economies of the West. And it is
difficult, if not impossible, to decide in which of these two regimes the
dysfunctions and negative features are more intense. But it is equally difficult
to answer whether or not there will continue to be differences between these
two regimes, and if so, which of them will prevail.
Austria
and Finland are moving in the same direction. “Populist” governments are also
dominating the Balkans, with the ultimate goal of permanently weakening the
EU's status. What exactly do the formerly dominant EU and the strong euro have
left? A utopia, which is soon in danger of revealing the ruins of an initially
exceptional effort. The new international economic order, lacking the
prominence and strong propaganda from the media, which was and still is enjoyed
by globalization, does not attempt to impose itself as a one-way solution or
paradise like its predecessor but simply appears on the international stage as
a necessity, to limit the widespread and multidimensional ailments of
globalization.
One
of the key arguments of the West in relation to its conviction that it will be
able to maintain its political status after China's international dominance, is
that in the world of the twenty-first century power is passed through
globalization and international organizations, controlled by the West itself[25]. This argument, however, has been greatly weakened by the severe blows
that globalization is taking with the introduction of protectionism and the
accusations Donald Trump has launched against international organizations and
the established economic order as a whole. This argument has also lost much of
its original glamour due to the rise of populism, which expresses the change of
public opinion and which turns directly against globalization and the system
prevailing in the West, in general. Now, concerning the influence and scope of
the "populist governments" in Europe
which has been invaded by them, regardless of the fact that it still seems to
be ignoring them, and pretends to still reign on the foundation of liberal
democracy. This is now clearly utopian, given that Britain has left the
European group and Italy has acquired a "populist", albeit rather
weak and unstable government.
Conclusion
The
question which needs to be
answered is whether Liberal Democracy or regimes regarded as authoritarian will
prevail[26]. Nowadays with
the constant threat of perpetual stagnation, the answer to the above question
should above all investigate which of the two systems is most effective:
· In achieving rapid
growth.
· in fighting corruption
· in achieving the most equitable distribution of income and wealth
· in ensuring full
employment
· in relation to the quality of public health and public education
services
· in the protection of dietary
risks
· in imposing meritocracy.
Although
the answers to these concerns are neither easy nor obvious at least for the moment, the inevitable
reflection around them uncovers a reality that the “non-populists” of the West
refuse to accept: that the issue is not so simple, nor its solutions so obvious
as they misleadingly appear but that, on the contrary, constant critical and
objective monitoring of the relevant developments is required. And that
furthermore, researchers who focus on this huge problem are neither traitors,
nor right-wingers, nor nostalgic of dictatorial regimes, nor communists.
In
any case, account should be taken of the fact that populists appear to be the
product of a radical change in voter preferences, especially among young
people. Indeed, while among the older Americans, 2/3 declare their preference
for Democracy, less than 1/3 of the young people care about it, while they are
favorable to the idea of a totalitarian regime and strongly critical of
democracy[27]. Let me add that two decades before today, 25%
of the British were favorable to the idea of an authoritarian government, and
they have now reached 50%. In countries like Germany, England and the United
States, the percentage of young people who favor a right or left extreme has
doubled in the last two decades, while in Sweden it has tripled. Similar rates
prevail in countries such as Hungary ,
Austria , Greece and Finland [28].
The dangerous, and seemingly generalized, transformations of the preferences of
Western voters appeared neither automatically nor in an incomprehensible way.
Unfortunately, these are the sad consequences of the totally unsuccessful
governance of traditional politicians who did not fulfill their pre-election
promises, who fermented or even
participated in corruption, who cultivated conditions of
low growth and high unemployment, who did not aim to limit the high inequalities
in income and wealth distribution, who destroyed the middle class through a
series of unfortunate policy measures and more. These are the main culprits for
the retreat of democracy, the rise of extremes, the generalization of populism.
The ideals of democracy are imposed on the citizens of a country where its
principles are respected and its offenses punished. Unfortunately, these are
not the conditions prevailing today in most of the modern Western states.
*** For a more extensive
analysis of this topic, Maria Negreponti-Delivanis, The end of the economic
dominance of the West, under publication: a) in Greek, IANOS and b) in French L'Harmattan
Selected References
Briefing European Populism (2018),
The Economist, 03/02.
Deudney, Daniel and Ikenberry G.
John (2009) "The myth of the autocratic Revival", Foreign Affairs,
January/February.
Ευρωπαϊκή
Επιτροπή - Frans Timmermans and Jyrki Katainen (2017) , "Paper on
reducing globalization" COM(2017) 240, 10/05.
"European populism-Threat and
opportunity" (2018), The Economist, 03/02.
Hansen, Alvin (1939),"Economic Progress and
Declining Population Growth" , American Economic Review 29
(1):1-15.
Lenglet, Francois (2014), La fin de
mondialisation, Librairie Arhème Fayard/Pluriel, Chapitre 5-L’éternel
retour.
Mattews, Jessica
Tuchman, Andrew Kohut and Stapleton Roy (2012) “US Public, Experts Differ on China Policies” Pew
Research Center-septembre.
Mounk Yasha (2018), "How
populist uprisings could bring down liberal democracy", The Guardian, Sun
4 Mars 07/05 GMT.
Mounk, Yascha (2018) "The people vs democracy", Harvard University Press.
Mounk,
Yasha and Roberto Stefan Foa (2018), "The End of
the democratic Century", Foreign Affairs, May-June, pp 29-36.
Muller,
Jan-Werner (2018), "The trouble with illiberal
democracy", International New York Times, 06/04.
*[1] National Review (http: //www.nationalreview.com/article/438915/donald-trumps-nationalism-not
bringing-nazism-america
Negreponti-Delivani, Maria (2014),
The Cold Blooded Murder of Greece, Maria and Dimitri Delivanis Foundation and
Ianos Publications (also in French, L'Harmatan, Paris).
Spengler, Oswald (1918) The decline of the West, Editor Alfred. A.
Knopf, N.Y. Vol. 1
Summers, Lawrence (2013) "Why Stagnation Might
Prove to be the New Normal", Financial Times, 15/12.
Scott, Robert (2017),
"Brexit:The end of globalization as we know it?" ΅Working Economics Blog-posted June 28 2016 at 12:26 pm.
Survey Monkey.
Notes:
[1] François Lenglet (2014), La
fin de mondialisation, Librairie Arhème Fayard/Pluriel, Chapitre
5-L’éternel retour.
[3] The western
civilization was born from the ashes of the ancient Greek civilization, with
the emergence after 1860, of the economic centers of Australia, G. Britain and
USA.
[4] "Economic
Progress and Declining Population Growth"(1939), American Economic
Review 29 (1):1-15.
[6] Yasha Mounk (2018),
"How populist uprisings could bring down liberal democracy", The
Guardian, Sun 4 Mars 07/05 GMT.
[10]Jessica Tuchman Mattews, Andrew Kohut and Stapleton Roy (2012) “US Public, Experts Differ on China Policies” Pew
Research Center-septembre .
[13] Robert Scott (2017),
"Brexit: The end of globalization as we know it?" ΅Working Economics Blog-posted June
28 2016 at
12:26 pm.
[15] Negreponti-Delivani
Maria (2014), The Cold Blooded Murder of Greece, Maria and Dimitri Delivanis
Foundation and Ianos Publications (also in French, L'Harmatan, Paris).
[17] National Review (http:
//www.nationalreview.com/article/438915/donald-trumps-nationalism-not
bringing-nazism-america)
[19] Yasha Mounk and Roberto
Stefan Foa (2018), "The End of the democratic Century", Foreign
Affairs, Μάιος/ Ιούνιος, σσ 29-36
[23] According to the
definition by Fareed Zakaria, Jan-Werner Muller (2018), "The trouble with
illiberal democracy", International New York Times, 06/04
[26] Daniel Deudney and G.
John Ikenberry (2009) "The myth of the autocratic Revival", Foreign
Affairs, Ιανουάριος/ Φεβρουάριος
THE POPULIST POLITICAL PARTIES AND THEIR OVERTHROW IN THE PREVALENT ORDER*** Maria NEGREPONTI-DELIVANIS University of Macedonia, Thessaloniki, Greece delimar@uom.edu.gr
Reviewed by Μαρία Νεγρεπόντη - Δελιβάνη
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Δεκεμβρίου 11, 2018
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